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Note
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Duties
Held by Malware Researchers, Penetration
Testers, and “White Hat” Hackers
Jon Watkins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than five years ago, the National Security Agency
(NSA) discovered a vulnerability1 in Windows’ implementation
of SMBv12 and developed a tool, EternalBlue,3 to exploit that
© 2018 Jon Watkins
* JD Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School; BA
University of Minnesota, 2016. Thank you to Professor Ralph Hall for his
feedback and guidance on this Note, to the editors and staff of MJLST for their
phenomenal work, and to Martha, Maddie, Tom, and Mona for everything.
1.
A “vulnerability” is an occurrence of a weakness (or multiple
weaknesses) within software, in which the weakness can be used by a
party to cause the software to modify or access unintended data,
interrupt proper execution, or perform incorrect actions that were not
specifically granted to the party who uses the weakness.
CYBERSEC. UNIT, U.S. DEP’T JUST., A FRAMEWORK FOR A VULNERABILITY
DISCLOSURE PROGRAM FOR ONLINE SYSTEMS 1 n.2 (2017).
2.
Server Message Block (SMB) is the file protocol most commonly used
by Windows. SMB Signing is a feature through which communications
using SMB can be digitally signed at the packet level. Digitally signing
the packets enables the recipient of the packets to confirm their point
of origination and their authenticity. This security mechanism in the
SMB protocol helps avoid issues like tampering of packets and “man
in the middle” attacks.
Jose Barreto, The Basics of SMB Signing, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Dec. 1, 2010),
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/josebda/2010/12/01/the-basics-of-smbsigning-covering-both-smb1-and-smb2/.
3. Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, NSA Officials Worried About the
Day Its Potent Hacking Tool Would Get Loose. Then It Did, WASH. POST (May
16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/nsa-officialsworried-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-loose-then-itdid/2017/05/16/50670b16-3978-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html.
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vulnerability. The NSA used EternalBlue to surveil numerous
targets with great success: as one former NSA employee said,
using EternalBlue was “like fishing with dynamite.”4 Despite
the NSA’s awareness of EternalBlue’s potency, the NSA
withheld information about the underlying security
vulnerability from Microsoft for years, perhaps fearing that the
subsequent patch would destroy one of the NSA’s most potent
tools.5
The consequences of the decision to withhold this
information became evident on April 14, 2017, when a group
calling themselves Shadow Brokers released a massive trove of
stolen NSA cyberweapons, including EternalBlue, to the public.6
Initial reporting on the release focused heavily on EternalBlue
and other vulnerabilities which appeared to be zero-day exploits7
to which every Microsoft computer on the planet would be
vulnerable.8 This apocalyptic scenario—an uncontrolled
cyberweapon capable of infiltrating the vast majority of
computers on the planet9—turned out not to be the case, as
Microsoft had released a security patch a month earlier,10 but
what actually happened is far from acceptable.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Dan Goodin, NSA-Leaking Shadow Brokers Just Dumped Its Most
Damaging Release Yet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:27 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/nsa-leaking-shadowbrokers-just-dumped-its-most-damaging-release-yet/.
7. See Tony Bradley, Zero Day Exploits, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.lifewire.com/zero-day-exploits-2487435 (“A zero day exploit is
when the exploit for the vulnerability is created before, or on the same day as
the vulnerability is learned about by the vendor.”).
8. Id.; see also Nicholas Weaver, Shadow Brokers Redux: Dump of NSA
Tools Gets Even Worse, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://
lawfareblog.com/shadow-brokers-redux-dump-nsa-tools-gets-even-worse.
9. Nicholas Weaver’s response to the April 14 Shadow Brokers dump is
representative of the attitude of many security professionals prior to learning
the SMB vulnerability exploited by EternalBlue had been patched by Microsoft:
“It really is a good weekend to turn off your computer.” Weaver, supra note 8.
The prospect of an unleashed cyberweapon so potent and so unexpected that
the only safe response for even the information-security literate is to turn one’s
computer off—and leave it off until a patch is available—should rightly be
considered terrifying.
10. Brad Smith, The Need for Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe
Online: Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON THE
ISSUES (May 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14
/need-urgent-collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weekscyberattack/; see also Goodin, supra note 6; Weaver, supra note 8.
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On May 12, 2017, less than a month after EternalBlue was
publicly released, EternalBlue was used as a means of spreading
Wannacry, the now-infamous malware that locked computers in
150 countries,11 caused up to $4 billion in losses,12 and crippled
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS).13 Even though
EternalBlue was by this point in time harmless to Windows
computers as long as the owner had applied the security patch
released two months earlier,14 immense numbers of computers
remained unpatched, and were therefore vulnerable.15
EternalBlue and Wannacry represent a unique set of
problems at the intersection of cybersecurity and law: did the
NSA have a responsibility to disclose the underlying SMB
vulnerability to Microsoft? Would the discoverer of that
vulnerability have had the same responsibility if it were not the
NSA, but instead a civilian, or a company which competes with
Microsoft? If any of these parties had such a responsibility, did
it arise when the vulnerability was first discovered? When
EternalBlue was stolen? Shadow Brokers are frequently
portrayed as a malicious actor in the story of Wannacry, but
what is it that makes their actions malicious? Is it because they
stole tools from the NSA? Is it because they allegedly released
zero-days and cyberweapons to the public? Is it because they did
not contact Microsoft in advance of the public release? Is it
something else entirely?
These questions are important, and many of them have no
sufficient answer or analogy in existing law. This Note will
attempt to address some of them, although addressing all of
them would be an immense undertaking which is outside the
scope of this Note. After addressing these questions and other
critical issues brought up by the current state of vulnerability
research and malware development, this Note concludes that
individuals who develop malware or discover software
vulnerabilities must be held to prevailing standards of
11. Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach
$4 Billion, CBS: MONEYWATCH (May 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www
.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/.
12. Id.
13. Owen Hughes, WannaCry Impact on NHS Considerably Larger than
Previously Suggested, DIGITAL HEALTH (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www
.digitalhealth.net/2017/10/wannacry-impact-on-nhs-considerably-larger-thanpreviously-suggested/.
14. Smith, supra note 10.
15. Id.
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disclosure, which must be developed and revised in cooperation
with a variety of stakeholders. The currently prevailing
standards, including Responsible Disclosure, are detailed at
length below. When individuals violate their duties as laid out
by these standards, they should be held civilly, or in rare cases
criminally, liable for their actions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. WHAT ARE VULNERABILITIES, AND WHY DO THEY MATTER?
Software can be very difficult to design. The software behind
a commonly used website or application can include anywhere
from ten thousand to ten million lines of code, and all of Google’s
Internet Service code combined amounts to over 2 billion lines of
code.16 While the ideal world may include software without
vulnerabilities, the sheer scale of much software means such a
world is not quite within our reach.17 Various groups have
drastically differing approaches to vulnerabilities. Government
actors like the NSA have an established practice of stockpiling
vulnerabilities rather than helping vendors remedy them.18 This
approach is highly effective at achieving national security

16. Codebases,
INF.
IS
BEAUTIFUL
(Sept.
24,
2015),
https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/million-lines-of-code/.
17. Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, It Is Just Unfair Using Trade
Laws to “Out” Security Software Vulnerabilities, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1099, 1099
(2017) (“All but the simplest software contains some vulnerabilities, including
coding errors.”).
18. Russell Brandom, After Shadow Brokers, Should the NSA Still Be
Hoarding
Vulnerabilities?,
VERGE
(Aug.
19,
2016,
9:53
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/19/12548462/shadow-brokers-nsavulnerability-disclosure-zero-day. But see THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING
WORLD 219 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files
/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf (advocating for an end to the NSA
stockpiling policy, and arguing the NSA should aid vendors in patching
vulnerabilities).
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objectives19 and at committing lucrative cybercrime,20 but is not
effective at protecting individual consumers or companies.21
Additionally, the line between vulnerabilities and malware
may be very thin: a demonstration of a vulnerability sufficient
to either sell that vulnerability or publicly disclose it generally
includes a proof of concept, and a proof of concept is, in turn,
typically very close in form to an exploit, which would be salable
as malware.22 For this reason, “malware” and “vulnerability”
will be used more or less interchangeably in this paper. While
they are conceptually different for programming purposes, this
difference has a negligible effect on how each should be disclosed
to the public.23

19. Mailyn Fidler, Anarchy or Regulation: Controlling the Global Trade in
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 11 (May 2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford
University) (on file with Stanford University), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file
/druid:zs241cm7504/Zero-Day%20Vulnerability%20Thesis%20by
%20Fidler.pdf (“The inclusion of zero-days in Stuxnet demonstrates their high
value to the U.S. government for offensive cyber operations.”).
20. Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study
of Zero-Day Attacks in the Real World, 19 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMMS.
SECURITY 833, 833 (2012), https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public
_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf
(“For
cyber
criminals,
unpatched
vulnerabilities in popular software, such as Microsoft Office or Adobe Flash,
represent a free pass to any target they might wish to attack, from Fortune 500
companies to millions of consumer PCs around the world.”).
21. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a
Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software
Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 793 (2016) (“[E]very zero day that is
secretly used by a government is one more zero day that can be used against
that government’s law-abiding citizens, either by that government or by
someone else.”).
22. Id. at 802 (“Vulnerability sales often require proof of concept, in which
case the seller will have to build a working exploit. At that time, the seller is
faced with another choice because he or she now has the start of a product, the
exploit, which could demand a high price on the black market.”).
23. Generally, the tech world uses “vulnerability” to refer to security flaws
in systems, and “malware” or “exploit” to refer to intentional exploitation of that
flaw. Id. at 759. Despite that important technical distinction, this paper focuses
mostly on the disclosure duty and other duties held by various parties, and
those duties rarely change due to this distinction. The distinction may be an
especially critical distinction in a negligence lawsuit focusing on causation, for
instance, but discussing vulnerabilities and malware separately in this paper
would result in substantial redundancy. Finally, this Note is not entirely alone
in opting to give less weight to this distinction in the context of duty. Clause 7.2
of ISO/IEC 29147, for example, states that while proofs of concept are sensitive
information, vendors have a general duty to provide a secure means to submit
all vulnerability reports, whether or not they include a proof of concept in
addition to information about the vulnerability. INT’L ORG. FOR
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Tech companies have a vested interest in producing secure
software, and fixing vulnerabilities in their software as soon as
possible. While many tech companies run bug bounty programs
which pay large amounts of money to third parties who find and
disclose vulnerabilities in the company’s code,24 these sums of
money may be dwarfed by the amount the vulnerability could
fetch on the black market,25 and some tech companies have a
practice of suing researchers who discover vulnerabilities in
their software—a practice which may heavily discourage
disclosure.26 Some researchers may also opt to publicly disclose
the vulnerability, with or without the cooperation of the software
vendor.27 The decision to publicly disclose a vulnerability often
comes with substantial risks.28 Despite these risks, public
disclosure is very popular, possibly because, as Kesan and Hayes
note: “Reputation is practically a currency in the information
security field. Being known as the person who discovered a major
security flaw might prove as valuable as being paid in legal
STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM., VULNERABILITY
DISCLOSURE: ISO/IEC 29147 § 7.2 (2014).
24. See,
e.g.,
Chrome
Reward
Program
Rules,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/chrome-rewards/ (last visited Apr.
14, 2018) (“Rewards for qualifying bugs typically range from $500 to $100,000.
We have a standing $100,000 reward for participants that can compromise a
Chromebook or Chromebox with device persistence in guest mode.”).
25. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761 (“Unfortunately, bug bounties
are often just a fraction of what the researcher could earn if he or she sold the
information to someone else.”); Robert Hackett, Jailbreaks Wanted: $1 Million
Dollar iPhone Hacks, FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/21
/ios9-million-dollar-hack/ (“The cybersecurity firm Zerodium announced on
Monday that it will reward $1 million to anyone able to crack Apple’s recently
launched iOS 9 operating system, which the startup’s website claims is ‘the
world’s most secure mobile OS.’”).
26. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 789. For a more recent example, see
Zack Whittaker (@zackwhittaker), TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://
twitter.com/zackwhittaker/status/976611110223835137, which describes a
recent lawsuit brought by a tech company against security researchers and a
news website regarding technicalities in the disclosure of a security
vulnerability in the tech company’s product.
27. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 793–94.
28. Compare Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20, at 2 (“After zero-day
vulnerabilities are disclosed, the number of malware variants exploiting them
increases 183–85,000 times and the number of attacks increases 2–100,000
times.”), with Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 793 (“Zero days are valuable on
the open market . . . as long as they remain unknown to others . . . . This aspect
of zero days may be one reason why many security researchers prefer to publicly
disclose vulnerabilities. By shedding light on the vulnerability, the value of the
vulnerability to malicious actors plummets.”).
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currency.”29 For this reason, safeguards on disclosure are
sometimes cast aside in the pursuit of recognition.30 There are,
of course, non-fame-related reasons to publicly disclose a
vulnerability,31 but these justifications may not be empirically
sound.32
This point brings us to the central questions of this paper—
what are the specific legal duties of cybersecurity professionals
with regards to disclosure? What safeguards need to exist to
ensure proper disclosure, and to ensure that vulnerabilities are
handled properly? How can any given system differentiate
between malicious, benign, and beneficial actors, and should

29. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 794. Some infrastructure does exist
for providing the types of reward and recognition which may well be currency
to a security researcher, and often couples that reward with actual currency.
This infrastructure includes BugCrowd and HackerOne, both of which are
recommended by I Am The Cavalry. BugCrowd, BUGCROWD, https://www
.bugcrowd.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); HackerOne, HACKERONE,
https://www.hackerone.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); I Am the Cavalry
Position on Disclosure, I AM THE CAVALRY (June 25, 2014), https://www
.iamthecavalry.org/about/disclosure/. Other bug bounty programs, including
Google’s, also personally name researchers who discover certain classes of
vulnerabilities—providing another avenue for the desired recognition. See, e.g.,
Chrome Reward Program Rules, supra note 24.
30. An example may help to illustrate this point. Recently, a security
researcher allegedly discovered a possibly enormous vulnerability—
unauthorized root access—within Mac OS X Sierra, and published the
vulnerability on Twitter, apparently without contacting Apple first. Lemi
Orhan Ergin (@lemiorhan), TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:38 PM),
https://twitter.com/lemiorhan/status/935578694541770752 (“Anyone can login
as ‘root’ with empty password after clicking on login button several times.”).
One account’s response was representative of widespread condemnation of this
disclosure: “QA failures notwithstanding: there’s no need to set an entire street
afire in order to point out that the kitchen in one house is burning.” Blacklight
(@blacklightpix), TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://twitter.com
/blacklightpix/status/935641138987286528.
31. Google Security Team, Rebooting Responsible Disclosure: A Focus on
Protecting End Users, GOOGLE SEC. BLOG (July 20, 2010),
https://security.googleblog.com/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclosurefocus.html (“[T]he argument for full disclosure proceeds: because a given bug
may be under active exploitation, full disclosure enables immediate
preventative action, and pressures vendors for fast fixes. Speedy fixes, in turn,
make users safer by reducing the number of vulnerabilities available to
attackers at any given time.”).
32. See, e.g., Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20 (“After zero-day
vulnerabilities are disclosed, the number of malware variants exploiting them
increases 183–85,000 times and the number of attacks increases 2–100,000
times.”); Google Security Team, supra note 31 (“We understand that not all bugs
can be fixed in 60 days, although many can and should be.”).
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such a differentiation change the duties that attach to any given
actor?33 Questions of duty and liability are especially important
in the cybersecurity context, because as Kesan and Hayes note:
“systems are particularly prone to failure when the person
guarding them is not the person who suffers when they fail.”34
In other words, consumer information may only be secure when
the corporations keeping that information in a vault, and the
hackers holding the keys to that vault, are both subject to
liability when something goes wrong. Under standard theories
of negligence, this liability can only arise where a standard of
care or duty exists.35
B. WHAT DUTIES ARISE IN SIMILAR CONTEXTS?
A general duty to behave in a manner which is not
unreasonably dangerous attaches to nearly everyone, nearly all
the time.36 There is no general duty to prevent harm caused by
the criminal acts of others,37 but such a duty can arise due to
certain relationships or in certain contexts—for example, the
duty to protect one’s patients can be strong enough to overcome
even therapist/client privilege.38 This duty to safeguard, and
other duties to prevent harm to third parties, are limited by
intervening causes.39 Intervening causes do not always sever
liability, especially where the harm caused by the intervention
was reasonably foreseeable.40 However, when considering cases
33. For a complex discussion of the types of individuals involved in malware
research, hacking, and related fields, see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 769
(adapting the Dungeons and Dragons Morality/Ethics framework to
cybersecurity).
34. Id. at 780 (quoting Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of
Information Security, 314 SCI., Oct. 27, 2006, at 610).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
36. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)
(quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 525 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974)) (“As
a general principle, a ‘defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are
foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the
conduct unreasonably dangerous.’”).
37. Bridges v. Parrish, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (N.C. 2013).
38. Tarasoff, 525 P.2d at 345.
39. Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1983).
40.
[A]n intervening intentional or criminal act will generally sever the
liability of the original tort-feasor, but, on the facts here, [Defendant]
may not rely on this doctrine.

2018]

NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED

543

involving less foreseeable acts, which may include criminal acts,
courts may be more likely to find that an intervening cause does
sever liability.41
Specifically considering the disclosure of dangerous
information, restrictions on disclosure have been established in
disciplines other than cybersecurity, and are often premised on
the logic that certain information is too dangerous to be disclosed
publicly. One example is the 2011 H5N1 (avian flu) publication
debate, which resulted in publication,42 but also in an
That doctrine has no application when the intentional or criminal
intervention of a third party or parties is reasonably foreseeable . . . .
When the intervening, intentional act of another is itself the foreseeable
harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard
against such conduct will not be relieved of liability when that act
occurs.
Id. (holding that a city was not freed of liability under intervening cause
doctrine where chemicals were insufficiently stored at a school, a child
subsequently lit the chemicals on fire, and was injured); see also Herrera v.
Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 194 (N.M. 2003) (finding that leaving a key in the
ignition of an unattended, unlocked car in a high-crime area owes a duty of
ordinary care to individuals injured in an auto accident when a thief steals the
car, even where the auto accident was criminally caused by the thief, because
the theft and accident were foreseeable).
41. See Wilken v. City of Lexington, 754 N.W.2d 616, 621–24 (Neb. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that an intervening cause severed liability where a police officer
had left an unrestrained prisoner and a loaded shotgun in his running vehicle,
and the prisoner subsequently shot the plaintiffs with said shotgun); Johnstone
v. City of Albuquerque, 145 P.3d 76, 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a
stepfather was not liable for juvenile’s suicide where said suicide was not
foreseeable, despite the stepfather’s failure to significantly safeguard his gun).
42. Michael J. Imperiale & Arturo Casadevall, A New Synthesis for Dual
Use Research of Concern, PLOS MED., Apr. 14, 2015, at 2,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4397073/pdf/pmed.1001813.pd
f (describing the debate over publication of the Kawaoka and Fouchier papers,
which described how a strain of avian influenza could be made transmissible by
air). Due to concerns that the contents of certain research papers could be used
for bioterror, many members of the scientific community, as well as the U.S.
Government, became involved in a protracted debate about whether or not the
papers could be published, and if so, whether the papers could be redacted. Id.
NSABB (the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity) recommended
that the portion of the paper consisting essentially of “instructions” should not
be published, although the end results of the research were sufficiently
significant to merit publication. Id. This finding was supported by the dominant
calculus for publication review in this context—the Dual Use Research of
Concern (DURC) Policy, originally published in 2007. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD.
FOR BIOSEC., PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE
SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF
RESEARCH INFORMATION 15 (2007). NSABB’s position was contradicted by the
U.S. Government, which forced NSABB to vote on either full publication or no
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extensively considered grant of power to the U.S. government to
restrict publication of Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC), as
well as a straightforward calculus for when publication should
be restricted.43 As another example, nuclear weapons are not
patentable,44 primarily because nuclear weapons are too
dangerous to be publicly disclosed as the U.S. patent system
requires.45 However, most analogous restrictions on disclosure
outside of those tied to privilege law46 use existing oversight
mechanisms such as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or
the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB),
instead of imposing a legal duty on the individual holding the
sensitive information.47
Finally, deviating slightly from the discussion of duty,
existing strict liability torts merit some consideration here.
Generally speaking, “abnormally dangerous activities” are
subject to strict liability rather than a conventional negligence
analysis—examples of such activities include certain illegal
publication—the papers were eventually published in full. Imperiale &
Casadevall, supra, at 2.
43. See Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 3. “[Federal Agencies
may] [r]equest voluntary redaction of the research publications or
communications[;][c]lassify the research, in accordance with National Security
Decision Directive/NSDD-189[; or] [n]ot provide or terminate research funding.”
Franca R. Jones, Dual Use Research of Concern: The March 29 Policy, NAT’L
SCI.
ADVISORY
BOARD
FOR
BIOSECURITY
(Nov.
27,
2012),
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NSABB_Meeting_Jones
_March_29_Policy_slides%20(1).pdf (emphasis in original).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012). Note, however, § 2181(a): “No patent shall
hereinafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely
in . . . an atomic weapon.” Id. (emphasis added). “Solely” invites a comparison
to dual-use research as described in note 42, as it implies that nuclear-related
patents which have a second use are not necessarily excluded under that
provision. Even though § 2181(a) predates the DURC policy by 71 years, it
implies the same policy foundation: there should be a presumption of disclosure
where some public benefit inheres in certain information, even if malicious
actors could misuse that information.
45. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY 206–07 (7th. ed. 2017).
46. See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 347
(1976) (“We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to
the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”); see also Upjohn Co. v.
U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”) (citing
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
47. E.g. Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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fireworks displays and the transportation of explosive
material.48 Under such an analysis, whether the defendant
exercised a reasonable standard of care is irrelevant. The
Restatement definition of “abnormally dangerous” is critical in
such cases—it applies strict liability only to activities which are
uncommon, and which “[create] a foreseeable and highly
significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is
exercised by all actors.”49 As will be discussed below, there is a
colorable argument that vulnerability and malware research is
abnormally dangerous, which would render the strict liability
analysis highly relevant.
C. WHAT DUTIES ARISE DUE TO CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION
AND INDUSTRY NORMS?
The U.S. government has attempted to bring clarity to
cybersecurity law in recent years. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently provided voluntary
cybersecurity standards,50 but said standards only infrequently
mention disclosure or the proper means of handling
vulnerabilities and malware. The Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA)51 permits voluntary sharing of “cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures,”52 and provides a shield from
antitrust liability where cybersecurity information is shared
between private entities for cybersecurity purposes,53 but
providing a shield for certain voluntary conduct does not
necessarily establish a duty to perform that conduct, and CISA
was also mostly targeted at large companies, rather than
individual researchers or small groups of researchers.54

48. See, e.g., JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & DOUGLAS
A. KYSAR, THE TORTS PROCESS 464 (8th ed. 2012).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Notably, there are other ways in which strict
liability can be applied to a certain situation, including, for example, possessing
exotic or dangerous pets. Id., §§ 22–23. Other situations in which strict liability
applies are, however, outside the scope of this paper.
50. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
51. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (Supp. 2016).
52. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 773.
53. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(e) (Supp. 2012).
54. See Eric Geller, Your Complete Guide to CISA, the Cybersecurity Bill
Scaring Privacy Activists, DAILY DOT (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:38 AM), https://www
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Furthermore, the mere existence of voluntary standards has
been criticized,55 which calls the standards stated in both the
CISA and the NIST into question. Further cybersecurity
legislation has been discussed which would more directly deal
with vulnerability and malware disclosure through treating
malware as a weapon subject to arms control,56 but its future is
uncertain. Additionally, similar to the DURC discussion in the
context of H5N1 above, many cybersecurity tools (including
some encryption technologies) are considered dual-use goods
under the Wassenaar Agreement, an international “voluntary
export control regime,” but the Agreement has little controlling
force, as it is not technically a treaty.57 Finally, for a discussion
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), see Part D below.
In addition to the legislation discussed above, discussions
surrounding industry norms58 for vulnerability and malware
disclosure abound. Kesan and Hayes note that public disclosures
of vulnerabilities are commonly made at industry conferences,
and that “[t]he current prevailing norm is to work with the
vendor ahead of time to ensure that the vulnerability is patched
before the presentation.”59 However, substantial debate exists
regarding precisely how much notice is appropriate, and
whether researchers may publicly disclose vulnerabilities at
.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-cisa-2015-s754-cybersecurity-informationsharing-act/.
55. E.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 776 (“Some critics question the
wisdom of even voluntary cybersecurity standards, due to the risk that
companies will adopt the bare minimum required to comply. Providing a higher
baseline than what might have existed before is valuable, but the danger comes
when agencies mistake practices that are necessary to improve security, and
practices that are sufficient to improve security.”).
56. See, e.g., John Reed, The U.S. Senate Wants to Control Malware Like
It’s a Missile, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 27, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://foreignpolicy
.com/2013/06/27/the-u-s-senate-wants-to-control-malware-like-its-a-missile/
(describing one such bill).
57. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 777. The Wassenaar Agreement,
which is essentially aimed at harmonizing export controls on conventional
weapons and DURC technology (see section B, supra, for a more in-depth
discussion of DURC), has been viewed as a tool for controlling the zero-day
vulnerability market. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 135.
58. The benefits of using industry norms to determine the direction of
cybersecurity law are substantial. See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer
Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (2016) (comparing judicial analysis in
the realm of virtual trespass to that of a “Martian from outer space,” and
asserting that “[w]ithout established norms to rely on, the application of a
seemingly simple concept like ‘authorization’ becomes surprisingly hard”).
59. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 794.
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conferences to pressure a vendor to patch a vulnerability, where
researchers believe the vendor has unduly delayed the patch.60
Additionally, lively debate exists regarding the ethics of any sort
of public disclosure,61 and researchers who rely on being able to
monetize their discoveries may find themselves disappointed by
the size of the bug bounty they may or may not receive from a
vendor, in the context of the payments they could receive on the
grey or black market from a government or other entity who
would effectively pay the researcher not to publicly disclose the
vulnerability.62
For researchers who are less interested in their bank
accounts, Responsible Disclosure63 is an appealing model, which
essentially requires that researchers give vendors a certain
period of prior warning before they release information about a
vulnerability publicly. Some Responsible Disclosure models rely
on cooperation with trusted third parties to delay disclosure by
a reasonable time frame.64 Nearly all Responsible Disclosure
models allow for the date of public disclosure to be adjusted
based on the severity of the vulnerability, as well as the needs of
both the vendor and the researcher.65 A number of parties have
extensively advocated for Responsible Disclosure and attempted
to provide incentives for researchers to participate,66 but
concerns about appropriate compensation persist, especially

60. Id. at 793–94.
61. See id. at 794–95 (“Disclosure is thus a double-edged sword, increasing
the likelihood of attacks while simultaneously supporting improvements in
security.”); Bilge & Dumitras, supra note 20, at 842 (“[T]he participants to the
debate disagree about whether trading off a high volume of attacks for faster
patching provides an overall benefit to the society.”).
62. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761 (“Unfortunately, bug bounties
are often just a fraction of what the researcher could earn if he or she sold the
information to someone else.”).
63. See Douglas Bonderud, The Responsible Disclosure Policy: Safeguard or
Cybercriminal Siren Song?, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 26, 2014),
https://securityintelligence.com/the-responsible-disclosure-policy-safeguard-orcybercriminal-siren-song/.
64. E.g. US-CERT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INFO SHEET, https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/infosheet_US-CERT_v2.pdf (“To protect
America’s cyberspace, US-CERT . . . [a]cts as a trusted third-party to assist in
the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities.”).
65. Google Security Team, supra note 31.
66. E.g. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, 803 (citing Derek E. Bambauer &
Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1086 (2011)) (“Bambauer
and Day, for example, recommend granting researchers immunity from
intellectual property litigation if they follow a responsible disclosure model.”).
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where the researcher discovers a vulnerability in the software of
a vendor who does not offer bug bounties.67 Proposals like
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) are highly similar
to Responsible Disclosure, and have much the same effect.68
Some authors have focused their proposals away from
researchers, and toward vendors. Recent litigation has sparked
some discussion of a duty to safeguard in the cybersecurity
context, although the cases to date have mainly focused on the
duty of companies to safeguard personally identifiable
information,69 and the extent to which intervening causes sever
liability related to that duty.70 Some authors have also argued
that vendors have a duty to write safe and vulnerability-free
code,71 although this duty seems practically impossible to

67. Many companies’ responsible disclosure policies expressly foreclose the
possibility of any compensation at all, and some explicitly threaten a lawsuit
will follow a request for compensation. E.g., Tricentis Flood Security, FLOOD BY
TRICENTIS, https://flood.io/security (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“Tricentis
reserves all of its legal rights in the event of any noncompliance . . . Requests
for monetary compensation in connection with any identified or alleged
vulnerability will be deemed noncompliant with this Responsible Disclosure
Policy.”). See generally Fahmida Y. Rashid, Facebook Joins Google, Mozilla,
Barracuda in Paying Bug Bounties, EWEEK (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.eweek
.com/blogs/security-watch/facebook-joins-google-mozilla-barracuda-in-payingbug-bounties.
68. See, e.g., Chris Betz, A Call for Better Coordinated Vulnerability
Disclosure, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Jan. 11, 2015), https://blogs.technet
.microsoft.com/msrc/2015/01/11/a-call-for-better-coordinated-vulnerabilitydisclosure/.
69. See, e.g., In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litig., No.
16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318, at *27 (“The crux of Plaintiffs’
allegations is not that Defendants safeguards failed to be ‘100% secure.’ Rather,
the crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that Defendants’ safeguards did not comply
with applicable laws and regulations and that Defendants’ data encryption
protocol was ‘widely discredited and had been proven, many years prior, easy to
break.’”).
70. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)) (“If the
likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or
one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act[,] whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal[,] does not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”).
71. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The
Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital
Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 137 (2010); Paul N. Stockton & Michele GolabekGoldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239,
251–52 (2013).
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fulfill.72 Additionally, both the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) vulnerability disclosure standard73 and
Department of Justice (DOJ) vulnerability disclosure
framework74 focus heavily on vendors, while the ISO standard
explicitly excludes researchers, and the DOJ framework largely
fails to assign them duty.75
Finally, it should be noted that the U.S. government is
frequently the party responsible for researching and managing
vulnerabilities, and substantial debate exists regarding various
proposals to limit the US government’s ability to stockpile
vulnerabilities.76 While sovereign immunity and related
doctrines are outside the scope of this Note, it should be
mentioned that many proposals have been put forward
regarding limiting the ability of the U.S. government to retain
vulnerabilities,77 although many authors doubt the U.S.
government is likely to ever give up the ability to use and
stockpile cyberweapons.78 These national security implications
72. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 17 (“All but the simplest software
contains some vulnerabilities, including coding errors.”).
73. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM.,
supra note 23, at v.
74. CYBERSEC. UNIT, U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 1, at 1.
75. While the DOJ Framework does point out that one incentive to create
a vulnerability disclosure program is reducing the possibility of inadvertent
violations of the CFAA, this portion of the Framework does not create any new
duties, nor does it really interpret existing duties under the CFAA. Id. at 1–2,
1 n.3. Instead, it aims to aid organizations in clarifying what access is
“authorized” and what is not, since “exceeding authorized access” may result in
a CFAA violation. Id. at 1–2.
76. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10 (“[W]e called in February for a new
‘Digital Geneva Convention’ to govern these issues, including a new
requirement for governments to report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than
stockpile, sell, or exploit them.”).
77. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 8 (“This dump also provides significant
ammunition for those concerned with the [U.S.] government developing and
keeping 0-day exploits. Like both previous Shadow Brokers dumps, this batch
contains vulnerabilities that the NSA clearly did not disclose even after the
tools were stolen. This means either that the NSA can’t determine which tools
were stolen—a troubling possibility post-Snowden—or that the NSA was aware
of the breach but failed to disclose to vendors despite knowing an adversary had
access. I’m comfortable with the NSA keeping as many 0-days affecting U.S.
systems as they want, so long as they are NOBUS (Nobody But Us). Once the
NSA is aware an adversary knows of the vulnerabilities, the agency has an
obligation to protect U.S. interests through disclosure.”).
78. See David E. Sanger, Nations Seek the Elusive Cure for Cyberattacks,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/01/21
/business/davos-international-cyberattack-prevention.html
(“The
United
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complicate analyses of the WannaCry/Shadow Brokers fact
pattern which introduced this Note—while under ordinary
principles, a duty may have existed for any private company to
share this information with Microsoft, the need for effective
national security tools may be a sufficiently strong
countervailing interest to justify the NSA’s sustained failure to
inform Microsoft of the SMB vulnerability exploited by
EternalBlue.79
D. WHAT CRIMINAL LAWS APPLY TO MALWARE RESEARCHERS?
The primary U.S. criminal law involving hacking is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),80 which may have been
enacted partially in response to War Games, a 1983 Cold Warthemed movie about hackers.81 Generally speaking, “the CFAA
criminalized exceeding authorized access to a protected
computer system.”82 The CFAA has been unevenly applied83 and
roundly criticized,84 but remains highly significant in this field
and in others.85 Recent litigation involving the CFAA has drawn

States, for example, would never support rules that banned espionage . . . . It is
a power that the United States and its allies, have no intention of giving up.”).
79. For more in-depth discussion of the national security implications
posed by NSA cyberweapon stockpiles, see Weaver, supra note 8, and Sanger,
supra note 78.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see Cassandra Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker:
Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 392 (2014).
81. See Kirsch, supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771 (“[S]ome question the
government’s enforcement patterns. A majority of referred CFAA cases are left
unprosecuted due to lack of evidence, while CFAA prosecutions that do go
forward sometimes play fast and loose with what it means to access a computer
without authorization.”).
84. See Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93 (“[A]ll hacking is essentially illegal
under the [CFAA] . . . . the CFAA has become so broad that the law now
‘threatens to swallow the Internet.’ . . . . The broad language of the CFAA is a
result of out-dated Internet philosophies from before the Internet’s
omnipresence in society.”); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771
(“[I]nconsistent applications of [CFAA] threaten to discourage benevolent
security research while encouraging the actions of malicious hackers who know
that their odds of being caught and prosecuted are slim.”); Fidler, supra note
19, at 68 (“The CFAA has been criticized for its ‘breadth and severity.’ The law
has increasingly been used to prosecute offenses . . . . one might not consider
classical hacking.”).
85. WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 472
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2016) (“[T]he use of the CFAA has evolved and a
large proportion of current litigation under the law—both criminal and civil—

2018]

NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED

551

substantial ire from the security community,86 but in the context
of vulnerability disclosure, at least one court has remarked that
merely publicly disclosing a vulnerability is not a CFAA
violation,87 in a case that attracted significant attention among
security researchers and computer scientists.88 The DOJ
recently publicized guidelines on CFAA prosecution,89 which
shed light on the Department’s thought process with regard to
the modern applicability of the CFAA: for the most part, the
Department is interested in prosecuting cases in which sensitive
information was accessed, or a “pillar of society,” such as public
health or major infrastructure, is threatened by the access.90
Finally, since virtually any crime can be committed online,91
crimes as serious as homicide may be committed as well. Given
the breadth of the CFAA as discussed above, and at least one
now involves the misappropriation of confidential business information or trade
secrets.”).
86. Kirsch, supra note 80, at 386–87 (discussing the facts of U.S. v.
Auernheimer, as well as the response to the verdict, which was “heavily
criticized by security professionals” as making “the rest of us less safe”).
87. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 795 (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.
v. Anderson, No. 1:08-CV-11364(GAO), 2008 WL 6954925 (D. Mass. Jan. 26,
2009)) (“Some vendors have attempted to argue that the act of publicly
disclosing a vulnerability or exploit is a violation of computer crime law, but no
court has officially ruled on this question. In 2008, the [MBTA] sued three MIT
students to prevent them from giving a presentation at a conference that
included information about a vulnerability in MBTA’s ticketing system. The
court denied MBT’’s request for a preliminary injunction and remarked that it
was unlikely that MBTA’s claim would succeed on the merits.”).
88. Brief of Amici Curiae Computer Science Professors and Computer
Scientists, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 1:08-CV-11364(GAO),
2008 WL 6954925 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2009).
89. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the U.S. Attorneys and
Assistant Attorney Gens. for the Criminal and Nat’l Sec. Div., Intake and
Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www
.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/904941/download [hereinafter Attorney General
Memorandum].
90. Jenna McLaughlin, Justice Department Releases Guidelines on
Controversial Anti-Hacking Law, INTERCEPT (Oct. 26, 2016, 11:30 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/26/justice-department-releases-guidelines-oncontroversial-anti-hacking-law/. The importance of these “pillars” is also
reflected in the existence of the 16 “Sector Coordinating Councils”—
information-sharing organizations with the goal of protecting critical sectors of
the American economy who receive high-clearance security information from
the U.S. government, from the private sector, and from each other. See Sector
Coordinating Councils, DHS (July 11, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/scc.
91. Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 60–
71 (2011) (describing a vast array of crimes committed through the use of
computers).
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general
definition
of
involuntary
manslaughter,92
unintentionally causing the death of an individual while
accessing any digital platform without authorization (which is
the core of conduct criminalized by the CFAA, even though other
elements beyond unauthorized access are necessary to proving a
crime) may be prosecutable as involuntary manslaughter. This
is somewhat comparable to law which existed before the digital
era: involuntary manslaughter has been found in the context of
a duty to safeguard.93 While no one as yet appears to have died
directly due to malware or similar attacks, such a death may be
an inevitability given the frequency of attacks on healthcare
systems.94 The DOJ CFAA guidelines mentioned above clearly
indicate that threats to public health are priorities for CFAA
prosecution,95 so the government may be eager to try a test case.
Much writing on the CFAA has focused on the idea that, as
a fairly broad statute, it over-criminalizes behavior which, while
perhaps not innocuous, should also not be criminal.96 Proponents
92. E.g., 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 127 (2018) (“Involuntary manslaughter is
committed when a person, while engaged in an unlawful act, unintentionally
causes the death of another or where a person engaged in a lawful act unlawfully
causes the death of another.”) (emphasis added).
93.
Defendant asserts that insufficient evidence was presented to support
her involuntary manslaughter conviction based on her failure to
perform a legal duty as there is no specific legal duty to “safeguard,
control and prevent the discFharge of a loaded firearm.” We disagree.
This conclusion is based on testimony that defendant had a loaded
gun in her hand as she tried to let herself in the house, that the victim
was only a few feet away from defendant, and that the gun somehow
fired, hitting the victim in the face. Sufficient evidence was presented
so that the jury could have inferred that it would be apparent to the
ordinary mind that failure to perform a legal duty to safeguard, control
and protect the loaded gun was likely to prove disastrous to the victim.
People v. Weaks, No. 183697, 1996 WL 33357539 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27,
1996).
94. Jesse M. Ehrenfeld, WannaCry, Cybersecurity and Health Information
Technology: A Time to Act, 41 J. MED. SYS. 104, 104 (2017); see also Filip Truta,
New Ransomware Attack Forces Hospitals to Turn Away Patients, HOT FOR SEC.
(Jan. 25, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://hotforsecurity.bitdefender.com/blog/newransomware-attack-forces-hospitals-to-turn-away-patients-19490.html
(describing how some hospitals are refusing to treat patients because their
electronic health records system were shut down by ransomware).
95. Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 89.
96.
The government’s construction . . . . [makes] criminals of large groups
of people who would have little reason to suspect they are committing a
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of the CFAA often point to prosecutorial discretion as a solution
to this problem,97 but detractors in turn point to cases where
prosecutors arguably overstepped.98 Additionally, since the
CFAA created a private right of action,99 prosecutorial discretion
simply has no role in many cases. For this reason, the rule of
lenity100 has been invoked in the context of the CFAA,101 but has
had little to no actual effect in narrowing the breadth with which
the statute is interpreted.102
III. ANALYSIS
A. HOW WELL WOULD ANY OF THESE APPROACHES ACTUALLY
WORK?
Each of the above approaches to assigning responsibility in
the context of vulnerability disclosure has worth, but some are
likely to have more of a positive impact than others. The
adoption of a negligence framework is perhaps one of the more
likely scenarios for further control of vulnerability disclosure, as
federal crime . . . . Basing criminal liability on violations of private
computer use polices can transform whole categories of otherwise
innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a computer is
involved.
United States v. Nosal (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled
by United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
the CFAA applies to misappropriation); Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in
Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news
/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology (“The Justice Department’s
interpretation [of the CFAA] makes the American desk-worker a felon.”).
97. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862 (“The government assures us that, whatever
the scope of the CFAA, it won’t prosecute minor violations.”).
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)) (“The
government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won’t prosecute
minor violations. But we shouldn’t have to live at the mercy of our local
prosecutor . . . ’ We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the government promised to use it responsibly.’”); MCGEVERAN, supra
note 85, at 473 (“[T]here certainly are examples where federal prosecutors used
CFAA charges to go after persons who may have been in their sights
notwithstanding any hacking allegations.”).
99. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
100. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 863 (quoting United States v. Witberger, 18 U.S.
76, 95 (1820)) (“The rule of lenity requires ‘penal laws . . . to be construed
strictly.’”).
101. E.g., id.
102. E.g., United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024, 1035 n.6
(declining to apply the rule of lenity due to a perceived lack of ambiguity in the
CFAA, despite acknowledging a narrower interpretation of the CFAA exists).
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negligence is an extraordinarily wide-ranging concept which has
been adapted to virtually every corner of modern American
life.103 Data breach litigation, for example, is a growing field of
negligence actions against companies holding consumer data.104
Malware researchers are already sued or threatened with
litigation somewhat frequently,105 and expanding negligence to
encompass allegedly improper vulnerability disclosure runs the
risk of chilling the enthusiasm of security researchers to
research and disclose vulnerabilities,106 and of pushing them
towards anonymous or black market disclosures.107
Negligence actions are an attractive proposition for dealing
with the problem of improper disclosure because courts are very
aware of how negligence works and an entirely new framework
may prove to be more confusing than an approach which merely
introduced new duties, or new ways to breach existing duties, to
the existing negligence framework. Adopting this framework
would give courts a straightforward means of treating malware
researchers as professionals who have adopted a set of
professional standards. Even though the development and
adjustment of those standards is—and will continue to be—
difficult, professional organizations and other groups with

103. HENDERSON, PEARSON & KYSAR, supra note 48, at 159.
104. See, e.g., In re The Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litig., MDL Docket No. 2583, 2016 WL 2897520, at *3–5 (N.D. Ga. 2016)
(discussing negligence law in the context of a data breach); In re Premera Blue
Cross Customer Data Security Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Or. 2016).
105. Legal
Threats
Against
Security
Researchers,
ATTRITION,
http://attrition.org/errata/legal_threats/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (providing
summaries of recent legal action against security researchers, and strongly
advocating that most such actions are baseless attempts to save face).
106. Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting
Vulnerabilities Will Chill Research, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR: PASSCODE (Sept.
29, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers
/2015/0929/Influencers-Lawsuits-to-prevent-reporting-vulnerabilities-willchill-research.
107. See Zack Whittaker, Lawsuits Threaten Infosec Research—Just When
We Need It Most, ZDNET (Feb. 19, 2018, 5:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com
/article/chilling-effect-lawsuits-threaten-security-research-need-it-most/ (“One
independent researcher, who asked not to be named, said that they will ‘simply
post details of a flaw anonymously online’ [due to fear of litigation].”); see also
Carollo, supra note 106 (“‘Numerous researchers have either stopped looking
for bugs, or worse, have stopped reporting them. The bugs are still there,
possibly being used by the bad guys, but fear of prosecution, for what amounts
to telling the truth, stops many researchers from reporting bugs.’”).
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expertise are better at this work than courts are,108 and courts
will benefit from the input of these groups every time an expert
witness testifies at trial. Medical malpractice cases already
delegate this responsibility to expert witnesses: “The
overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that
ordinarily expert evidence is essential to support an action for
malpractice against a physician or surgeon.”109 Allowing expert
witnesses and professional organizations to set the standards of
malware research could decrease the work required by courts
and would likely result in law which better reflects the
professional standards actually adopted by industry. Other
elements of negligence, such as causation, are also highly likely
to require expert testimony in technologically complex cases.110
On the other hand, negligence actions may not be the best
way to handle vulnerability disclosure, simply because malware
researchers typically have fewer financial resources and less inhouse legal capacity compared to the companies whose products
they research.111 This asymmetry means some tech companies
may bully well-meaning and responsible researchers into silence
through threats of meritless litigation. Recourse does exist in
other areas of the law for defendants of meritless litigation, such
as fee-shifting measures112 and anti-SLAPP laws,113 but even if
108. Many organizations are already engaged in crafting similar systems of
voluntary standards. See, e.g., NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note
50; 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2012). But see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 776
(“Some critics question the wisdom of even voluntary cybersecurity standards,
due to the risk that companies will adopt the bare minimum required to comply.
Providing a higher baseline than what might have existed before is valuable,
but the danger comes when agencies mistake practices that are necessary to
improve security, and practices that are sufficient to improve security.”).
109. H. H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an
Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R. 2d 597 Art. 1,
§ 2 (1962).
110. Causation in particular has played a large role in other cybersecurity
cases. E.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2012)
(Pryor, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs alleged only correlation, rather
than causation).
111. See, e.g., Whittaker, supra note 107 (documenting the chilling effect of
legal threats on security researchers).
112. See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 70–
74 (2016) (discussing cost asymmetry in litigation, as well as fee-shifting laws
and other means of accounting for cost asymmetry).
113. For a discussion of Anti-SLAPP statutes in general, and for a discussion
of California’s Anti-SLAPP statute in particular, see Brian D. Shaffer,
California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Potent, Yet Confounding, Weapon, 27
MILLER & STARR REAL EST. NEWSALERT 589 (2017).
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a cybersecurity law expressly applied such recourse to the
vulnerability disclosure context, securing such recourse would
itself require an investment, which small companies or
individuals may not be able to afford.114 Taking into account, as
noted above, that some tech companies have already sued
malware researchers in what may be attempts to silence
criticism of their products,115 the expansion of negligence to
encompass allegedly improper vulnerability disclosure may be
unwise, since it provides additional grounds for litigation which
may be baseless. Finally, encouraging negligence actions as the
primary means for addressing improper vulnerability disclosure
may have a negative impact on the development of the law,
simply because the development of case law is typically a long
process.116 While courts develop the case law on improper
vulnerability disclosure over what may be decades, the industry
may be left with frustrating uncertainty as to what the rules
actually are.
Adopting a strict liability analysis of vulnerability
disclosure may be an appealing alternative to general
negligence, but if it were to be adopted, it should be greatly
constrained to a miniscule subset of vulnerability disclosure
which is truly “abnormally dangerous.”117 The Restatement
definition of “abnormally dangerous” is confined to uncommon
activities which “[create] a foreseeable and highly significant
risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by
all actors.”118 In applying this definition to vulnerability
disclosure, it’s important to keep in mind that most vulnerability
research is probably not uncommon in the sense necessary to

114. For an in-depth analysis of the cost and process of fighting malicious or
frivolous lawsuits in states both with and without anti-SLAPP legislation, see
Ken White, Why, Yes, I AM Into SLAPPing, POPEHAT (June 7, 2012),
https://www.popehat.com/2012/06/07/why-yes-i-am-into-slapping/.
115. Legal Threats Against Security Researchers, supra note 105.
116. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless
World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2007) (noting that between Warren and
Brandeis’s conception of the privacy torts and Dean Prosser’s solidification of
them, 70 years passed).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Notably, there are other activities in addition
to those that are “abnormally dangerous” in which strict liability can be applied
to a certain situation, including, for example, possessing exotic or dangerous
pets. Id. §§ 22–23.
118. Id. § 20.
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meet this definition.119 Additionally, the requirement of
“physical harm” probably forecloses the vast majority of these
cases, since any harm caused by improper disclosure is
overwhelmingly unlikely to be physical. Third, “reasonable
care,” properly defined, is likely to foreclose the possibility of
significant harm.
Because it may not be intuitive that reasonable care has
that effect, an example may be provided by examining the
Shadow Brokers leak discussed at the beginning of this Note.120
Shadow Brokers disclosed massive amounts of information
about zero-day exploits and other cyberweapons, including
EternalBlue, to the public without first contacting Microsoft, the
NSA, or any other parties.121 This is clearly a violation of
reasonable care, because reasonable security researchers
generally don’t do any of the following: A) break into and steal
information from government databases,122 B) publicly release
volatile information without contacting vendors or other
impacted parties (in this case, Microsoft) to mitigate the harm
which could follow such a release,123 or C) fail to redact or delay
such information in any manner.124 Shadow Brokers involved
themselves in incredibly dangerous activities which resulted in
massive consequences, but those activities were dangerous
because Shadow Brokers failed to exercise reasonable care,
rather than despite their exercise of reasonable care. A likelihood
of serious consequences despite reasonable care is the linchpin of

119. This is a somewhat complex question to analyze but consider one
metric: approximately 80,000 Americans hold Certified Information Systems
Security Professional (CISSP) qualifications. This common information security
certificate requires expertise comparable to the level of expertise needed to
carry out vulnerability research. (ISC)2 Member Counts, (ISC)2 (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.isc2.org/About/Member-Counts.
120. Goodin, supra note 6.
121. Id.
122. This behavior is clearly delineated as unreasonable by both the letter
and the spirit of the CFAA. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(b) (2012). To clarify—”break
into” implies a lack of authorization or some practice that goes beyond existing
system authorization, even though authorization in a different sense may exist
for this behavior given other facts. For instance, a penetration testing company
could secure authorization to attempt to break into the DOJ’s computer system
without violating the CFAA.
123. Existing norms and existing Responsible Disclosure policies render this
unreasonable. See, e.g., Bonderud, supra note 63.
124. This is also rendered unreasonable by Responsible Disclosure norms
and policies. See, e.g., id.
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strict liability,125 and because a reasonable standard of care in
cybersecurity can go a long way to prevent serious consequences,
strict liability will typically be an inappropriate analysis in the
context of vulnerability disclosure.126
One specific facet of Shadow Brokers is perhaps more
interesting than others in the context of strict liability: Shadow
Brokers stole a stockpile of information and cyberweapons from
the NSA, and they released that information in large “dumps,”
which can fairly be regarded simply as public stockpiles.127 Some
groups, including Microsoft128 and advisory entities within the
Obama Administration,129 have questioned the general concept
of stockpiles, and have argued a point similar to a strict liability
analysis—cyber-weapons stockpiles are dangerous things, even
when great care is exercised.130 Some entities in the research
community have pushed back on the criticism of stockpiles.
Malpedia is one example of a fairly large stockpile of malware,
much of it unpatched and dangerous, which is maintained and
used for research purposes.131 Malpedia is “operated as an
invite-only trust group”—meaning access to the stockpile is
limited to researchers known to its operator as trustworthy.132
Assuming that a duty exists to responsibly limit access to
dangerous cyberweapons only to those parties who would not
reasonably be expected to use the information maliciously,
Malpedia fulfills that duty better than Shadow Brokers, who did
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
126. Creating a hypothetical in which strict liability would be appropriate is
difficult, but one example of the rare scenarios in which strict liability would be
the appropriate analysis follows: imagine a penetration testing company, hired
to test the security and operability of systems which regulate a running nuclear
reactor (assume that it is not possible to test the programs while the reactor has
been safely shut down). Even with the highest conceivable standard of care, this
test is absolutely an abnormally dangerous activity, because even though the
risk is low, successful penetration could have catastrophic consequences if some
critical system function was altered because of the testing.
127. Goodin, supra note 6.
128. Smith, supra note 10.
129. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS
TECHS., supra note 18; see also Brandom, supra note 18.
130. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS
TECHS., supra note 18.
131. Malpedia, FRAUNHOFER FKIE, https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer
.de/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
132. Malpedia Terms of Service, FRAUNHOFER FKIE, https://malpedia
.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/terms_of_service (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
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not restrict access to their dump at all. However, Malpedia’s
security infrastructure is almost certainly weaker than the
NSA’s—and as Shadow Brokers made all too clear, even the NSA
is not invulnerable.133
Criminal law will likely remain relevant in this area.
Despite substantial criticism of the CFAA,134 the DOJ has
released memoranda which appear to indicate that CFAA
prosecutions will continue.135 Specifically, the most recent
memorandum indicates that the DOJ is interested in trying a
CFAA case in which a risk of bodily harm existed.136 In the
context of recent threats to hospital and healthcare systems,137
this may indicate that the DOJ would be willing to try a case in
which, for instance, ransomware shut down a system which was
directly responsible for sustaining a patient’s life.
Despite this sustained enthusiasm on the part of the DOJ,138
a scenario in which the CFAA is either replaced or heavily
amended is likely to be much more palatable to many scholars.139
Kirsch argues that “all hacking is essentially illegal under the
[CFAA],” that “the CFAA has become so broad that the law now
‘threatens to swallow the Internet,’” and that “the broad
language of the CFAA is a result of out-dated Internet
philosophies from before the Internet’s omnipresence in
society.”140 The central problem with the CFAA is likely that the
concept of “unauthorized access” is immensely broad and
nebulous,141 which may lend itself to excessive prosecutorial
discretion.142 In order to address these problems, a new and
133. Goodin, supra note 6; see also Smith, supra note 10.
134. See McLaughlin, supra note 90.
135. Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 89.
136. Id.
137. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 94; Truta, supra note 94.
138. This enthusiasm may not always be shared by the companies on whose
behalf the DOJ brings criminal charges. See Kerr, supra note 58, at 1170 (“It is
telling that when the government has pursued aggressive criminal charges
under the CFAA for use of websites, it has often been without the support of the
companies claimed as victims.”).
139. See McLaughlin, supra note 90; see also Kerr, supra note 58.
140. Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93.
141. Fidler, supra note 19, at 68, (“The CFAA has been criticized for its
‘breadth and severity.’ The law has increasingly been used to prosecute
offenses . . . one might not consider classical hacking.”).
142. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 771 (“[S]ome question the
government’s enforcement patterns. A majority of referred CFAA cases are left
unprosecuted due to lack of evidence, while CFAA prosecutions that do go
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modern cybercrime law could adopt language substantially
different from “unauthorized access” to describe criminal usage
of a computer, language could be added to the CFAA through
amendment or judicial interpretation which clearly delineates
what “unauthorized access” means, or the DOJ could work with
industry groups to discuss possible amendments to the
prosecutorial guidelines, aimed at criminalizing only
detrimental “unauthorized access.”143 The modern world is one
in which certain kinds of hacking should be perfectly legal. The
CFAA needs to be reinterpreted or amended in order to better
reflect that view, and until it is, criminal law in the area of
cybersecurity will be significantly outdated.144
Other possible approaches do exist, including Kesan &
Hayes’ market approach145 and the Dual-Use Research of
Concern (DURC) approach used in biohazard research and in the
Wassenaar Agreement.146 The market approach is probably
unhelpful, if only because it may pose another barrier to entry
into tech—an industry which depends heavily on startups. Bugs
are common in all software, and many start-ups would have an
incredibly difficult time justifying to investors a seven-figure
budget for buying all the bugs in their software. DURC is also
forward sometimes play fast and loose with what it means to access a computer
without authorization . . . . [I]nconsistent applications of [CFAA] threaten to
discourage benevolent security research while encouraging the actions of
malicious hackers who know that their odds of being caught and prosecuted are
slim.”).
143. One polarizing issue on this final point may be the prosecution and
subsequent suicide of Aaron Swartz, an internet activist who was charged under
the CFAA after he downloaded several million academic journals articles.
McLaughlin, supra note 90; Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11
/requiem-for-a-dream. Discussions about Swartz illustrate the human cost of
uncertainty regarding the bounds of the CFAA.
144. See Kirsch, supra note 80, at 392–93 (arguing the CFAA is outdated);
Orin Kerr, Obama’s Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute: A Deep
Dive, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14
/obamas-proposed-changes-to-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deepdive/?utm_term=.905180db351b (“The law is a mess, yes. And there are some
frightening readings of the law that courts might adopt under the current
text . . . [but] I’m relatively optimistic that the narrower readings will prevail if
and when the Supreme Court turns to the CFAA.”).
145. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 817–29.
146. See Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 2–4 (discussing DURC in
biohazard research); Fidler, supra note 19, at 135 (discussing the Wassenaar
Agreement).
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probably inappropriate, for three reasons: A) no analogous
oversight mechanism to the NIH exists in information security,
even though some systems like NIST do provide voluntary
standards, B) DURC in the biotechnology field functions largely
through threats of removing federal funding,147 threats which
cannot be applied to private tech companies and private
malware researchers, and C) a dual-use analysis was already
attempted in the context of vulnerabilities with the Wassenaar
Agreement, which has gone essentially nowhere.148
B. WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD ULTIMATELY ATTACH TO
VULNERABILITY RESEARCHERS AND ADJACENT INDUSTRIES?
Industry groups and other stakeholders are likely the most
qualified individuals to discuss the specific duties incumbent on
malware researchers. With that in mind, Responsible
Disclosure149 is likely the standard which has the most support
of individuals and organizations in the information security
industry.150 Responsible Disclosure is also desirable because it
would integrate well with common law negligence, since
authorship on Responsible Disclosure tends to clearly delineate
the respective duties of security researchers and companies.151
Through adopting the considered analysis and thought of many
information security scholars, courts are likely to come to a much
more accurate conception of the standard of care owed by
vulnerability researchers. Responsible Disclosure has
historically had some problems with providing an appropriate
incentive to malware researchers, especially when compared to
the black market,152 so other means of encouraging Responsible
Disclosure should be developed. These might include federal
subsidies or tax incentives for bug bounties, immunity from
related IP infringement or CFAA cases,153 or other incentives.

147. Imperiale & Casadevall, supra note 42, at 3.
148. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 777.
149. See Bonderud, supra note 63.
150. Google Security Team, supra note 31.
151. See, e.g., id.
152. See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 761.
153. See, e.g., id. at 803 (citing Derek E. Bambaeur & Oliver Day, The
Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1086 (2011)) (“Bambauer and Day, for
example, recommend granting researchers immunity from intellectual property
litigation if they follow a responsible disclosure model.”).
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Even if Responsible Disclosure were to be adopted, it only
covers so much ground, and leaves many questions
unanswered—for instance, what level of access restriction
should we consider “responsible” when managing a stockpile of
cyberweapons? Shadow Brokers is certainly irresponsible in
their total lack of restriction, but is Malpedia154 irresponsible
because they operate a stockpile of unpatched malware despite
lacking resources comparable to a branch of the largest military
on the planet?155 Is the NSA irresponsible because their security
was breached despite presumably using those resources wisely?
Ideally, the answers to these questions would correspond to a
sliding scale, in which the level of requisite protection
corresponds to the apparent danger posed by the material
stockpiled. This is somewhat a common sense approach: most
people would consider someone a responsible weapon custodian
if she locked a gun in a well-built safe, but not if she locked a
nuclear weapon in the same safe.
Confusingly, however, analyses using such a sliding scale
may conclude that Malpedia responsibly protects their stockpile
while the NSA did not, even if the NSA had invested more in
security infrastructure and created an environment which was
overall much more secure than Malpedia’s. Additionally, a
sliding scale approach may create difficulties when a particular
piece of malware poses an uncertain danger. If a security
researcher quarantines a suspicious file from a spam e-mail and
uploads it to a service like Malpedia for further research without
realizing that the file contains a highly engineered cyberweapon
utilizing a handful of kernel-level zero-day exploits in Windows,
that security researcher may have unwittingly catapulted the
service’s obligation to restrict access to a much higher level (if
the sliding scale proposed depends only on what the service
actually holds, rather than on what they know—constructively
or otherwise—they hold). In such a situation, the sliding scale
rule would a) likely fail to provide adequate limits on access to
the malware, and simultaneously b) unfairly impose an
extremely high obligation on an unwitting service, despite that
service’s reasonable belief that they were fulfilling their security
obligations. The latter may be “solved” by adapting the rule to
154. Malpedia, supra note 131.
155. What We Do: Support to the Military, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (May 3, 2016),
https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/support-the-military/ (“The National Security
Agency is part of the U.S. Department of Defense.”).
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adjust protection in accordance with the service’s reasonable
expectation of the danger imposed by their stockpile, but such a
change would probably fail to inspire any sense of certainty. As
to the former, there is probably no satisfying solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shadow Brokers and groups like them, who carelessly
disclose the practical equivalent of a weapon to the public at
large without sufficient care, must be held responsible for their
carelessness. As discussed above, this is possible under a variety
of approaches. The CFAA provides a great deal of power and
discretion to prosecutors, for example, but such discretion may
be misapplied in less clear-cut cases. Because of the uncertainty
in the CFAA’s application, civil actions such as negligence are a
better way to address alleged wrongs in the context of
vulnerability disclosure, especially when industry experts are
allowed to testify as to critical aspects of the case, such as duty.
Responsible Disclosure and similar doctrines could be
determinative in such cases. These doctrines can gain legal
weight two ways. First, they may be incorporated into the
common law through inclusion in judicial opinions after trials at
which expert witnesses testified. Second, states or the U.S.
Government may pass statutes requiring researchers to meet
Responsible Disclosure standards, which would thereby render
non-compliant researchers per se negligent. Widespread
adoption of industry standards like Responsible Disclosure,
coupled with allowance for continued industry input to courts
and other decision-makers regarding updates to those
standards, is in the best interest of everyone involved in
vulnerability disclosure.

***

